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FAILURE TO OBJECT TO IN-COURT RESTRAINTS:
THE BOOSE AND PLAIN ERROR DOCTRINES
IN PEOPLE V. ALLEN
The presumption of innocence is central to our administration of
criminal justice. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, an ac-
cused has the right to stand trial "with the appearance, dignity, and
self-respect of a free and innocent man."'
INTRODUCTION
Before an Illinois trial court may place a defendant in physical re-
straints, it must conduct a Boose hearing to determine whether there
is "manifest need" for the restraints.2 Questions surrounding the im-
pact of denying a criminal defendant a Boose hearing before placing
him in physical restraints 3 have arisen with marked frequency in re-
cent years.4 Confusion has been further compounded when defend-
ants did not properly preserve the issue for appellate review and
wished to avail themselves of the hard-to-read plain error doctrine. 5
On June 2, 2006, the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v. Al-
len,6 a case that will significantly impact future criminal proceedings.
The Allen court held that restraining a defendant without the benefit
1. In re Staley, 364 N.E.2d 72, 73 (Ill. 1977) (quoting Eaddy v. People, 174 P.2d 717, 719 (Colo.
1946)).
2. People v. Boose, 362 N.E.2d 303, 305-06 (Il1. 1977).
3. Courts have tended to use the term "shackles" interchangeably with other terms such as
"restraints," "physical restraints," and "fetters." See, e.g., People v. Martinez, 808 N.E.2d 1089,
1091-92 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (alternating the terms "restraints," "physical restraints," and "shack-
ling" in reference to electronic stun belts). This usage is confusing, because, at times, courts have
been forced to address the propriety of varying degrees of physical restraints, from handcuffs, to
traditional shackles, to electronic stun belts. See, e.g., Staley, 362 N.E.2d at 74-75 (Underwood,
J., dissenting) (comparing a complex system of chains and belts to simple handcuffs). For clar-
ity's sake, this Note will confine its usage of the term "shackle" to the word's traditional mean-
ing, "a pair of fetters connected together by a chain, used to fasten a prisoner's wrists or ankles
together." THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1554 (2d ed. 2005). This Note will use
the terms "restraints" or "physical restraints" to refer to any type of device that induces a "dep-
rivation or restriction of personal liberty or freedom of movement." Id. at 1444. To avoid future
confusion, the author encourages courts to do the same.
4. See, e.g., People v. Buckner, 831 N.E.2d 676, 678-80 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); People v. Brown,
828 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); People v. Crutchfield, 820 N.E.2d 507, 514-15 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2004).
5. See, e.g., Buckner, 831 N.E.2d at 679-80; Brown, 828 N.E.2d at 354; Crutchfield, 820 N.E.2d
at 514-15.
6. People v. Allen, 856 N.E.2d 349 (Ill. 2006).
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of a Boose hearing does not constitute per se plain error, thus requir-
ing defendants to show something more than improper restraint to
obtain a remedy. 7 This Note focuses on Allen's effect on the Boose
and Illinois plain error doctrines. Part II exposes the roots of the
Boose-Staley doctrine as well as the inner workings of the Illinois plain
error doctrine.8 Part III summarizes the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Allen. 9 Part IV examines Allen from both Boose and plain
error perspectives, concluding that Allen is inconsistent with the spirit
of the Boose-Staley doctrine and unjustly distorts the Illinois plain er-
ror doctrine. 10 Finally, Part V presents Allen's impact on the Boose
and Illinois plain error doctrines. 1
II. BACKGROUND
To understand the significance of the Allen decision, one must first
understand the histories of both the Boose-Staley doctrine and the Illi-
nois plain error doctrine. First, this Part provides a brief history of the
English common law prohibitions against unnecessary in-court re-
straints, the adoption of that rule by American courts, and how that
adoption led to the Boose-Staley doctrine in Illinois. 12 Next, this Part
addresses the confusion in Illinois courts surrounding the application
of the Boose-Staley doctrine to defendants who failed to properly pre-
serve the restraints issue for appellate review. 13 Finally, this Part sum-
marizes the current plain error doctrine, including the doctrine's
purpose and application in Illinois.14
7. Id. at 357. Illinois courts have been divided as to what the remedy should be for a defen-
dant who was improperly restrained during his judicial proceedings. Compare Buckner, 831
N.E.2d at 680 (finding plain error in the unjust restraining of a defendant and remanding the
case for a "retrospective Boose hearing"), with Brown, 828 N.E.2d at 354 (finding plain error
after a trial court improperly restrained the defendant, reversing the conviction, and remanding
the case).
8. See infra notes 12-66 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 67-102 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 103-189 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 190-224 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 15-30 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 32-53 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text. For a more elaborate history of the Illinois
plain error doctrine, how it differs from the federal plain error rule, and how it has been clarified
in recent decisions, see Steven W. Becker, To Review or Not to Review: The Plain Truth about
Illinois' Plain Error Rule, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 455 (2006).
[Vol. 57:193
2007] PEOPLE V. ALLEN 195
A. The History of Prohibiting In-Court Restraints
The prohibition of unnecessary in-court restraints dates at least as
far back as seventeenth-century English common law. 15 English
courts assumed that improperly placing a defendant in restraints inva-
riably jeopardized his ability to participate in his own defense. 16 Con-
sequently, physical restraints were properly placed on a defendant
during trial only when the court feared that the defendant might
escape. 17
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, this idea gained recogni-
tion in the United States. 18 The first American courts to address im-
prolier physical restraint echoed English courts' concerns that
restraining a defendant during trial "inevitably tends to confuse and
embarrass [a defendant's] mental faculties, and thereby materially to
abridge and prejudicially affect his constitutional rights of defense"
and should only be used when the court fears that the defendant will
escape.19 In addition, American courts were concerned that physical
restraints might adversely affect the defendant's presumption of inno-
cence-a presumption central to the constitutionality of criminal pro-
15. The Missouri Court of Appeals in State v. Kring, 1 Mo. App. 438 (1876), affd, 65 Mo. 591
(1877), traced the prohibition against unnecessary in-court restraints back through its origins in
English common law, potentially past the seventeenth century and as far back as Bracton, Fleta,
and the Magna Carta:
It is laid down in our ancient books of the law that, though under indictment of the
highest nature, as murder or high treason, the prisoner must be brought to the bar
without irons or any manner of shackles or bonds; unless there be evidence danger of
an escape, and then he may be secured by irons.
Id. at 440 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 Commentaries 322). See also Joan M. Krauskopf,
Physical Restraint of the Defendant in the Courtroom, 15 ST. Louis U. L.J. 351, 351-53 (1971)
(describing a similar, but more detailed, history of common law prohibitions on in-court
restraints).
16. Not all justices, however, interpret the common law this way. Compare Kennedy v. Card-
well, 487 F.2d 101, 106 (6th Cir. 1973) (recognizing the English concern that restraints inhibit a
defendant's ability to defend himself despite the fact that English cases seemed more concerned
with the "physical pain and torment" caused by the restraints used at that time), and People v.
Harrington, 42 Cal. 165, 165 (1871) (asserting that unnecessary physical restraints of any type
placed upon a prisoner during his trial inevitably inhibit his ability to participate in his own
defense), with Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 638-40 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (declaring
that the common law rule is not relevant in today's courts because it developed under a system
that required defendants to present their own cases without counsel and because ancient
shackles induced torturous pain not experienced by today's defendants).
17. See Harrington, 42 Cal. at 167.
18. See id. (adopting the English common law's "entitle[ment] to appear free of all manner of
shackles or bonds"); Kring, 1 Mo. App. at 440-41 (recognizing the English tradition of requiring
that defendants be allowed to present themselves unfettered in court).
19. Harrington, 42 Cal. at 168; see also Kring, 1 Mo. App. at 440.
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ceedings2 0-and that such restraints would offend the "dignity and
decorum of the judicial process. '21 Although these rules emerged at
the state level in the nineteenth century, a majority of states, including
Illinois, did not address this issue until the twentieth century. 22
1. Prohibition on Fetters in Illinois
In a 1904 case, Hauser v. People, Illinois first addressed the issue of
in-court restraints. 23 There, the Illinois Supreme Court echoed the
concerns of earlier English and American courts that physical re-
straints may result in unfair jury prejudice. 24  The Hauser court
granted sheriffs "a large degree of discretion" in restraining a defen-
dant while bringing him into the courtroom and affirmed that physical
restraints should be removed once they are no longer necessary. 25 Af-
ter Hauser, the issue of in-court physical restraint went largely unno-
ticed in Illinois until the 1970s.
In the 1970s, both state and federal courts decided several key cases
that addressed the propriety of physically restraining defendants in
the courtroom. 26 Most notably, in Illinois v. Allen, the United States
Supreme Court noted that "no person should be tried while shackled
and gagged except as a last resort. '27 In Kennedy v. Cardwell, the
Sixth Circuit decided whether manacling a defendant to a deputy
sheriff during trial infringed upon the defendant's due process rights. 28
The Sixth Circuit, reiterating the teachings of Illinois v. Allen, found
that "it is an abuse of discretion precipitously to employ shackles
when less drastic security measures will adequately and reasonably
suffice."'29 Finally, in 1977, the Illinois Supreme Court reexamined the
issue of unnecessary restraints in the Boose and Staley cases. Therein,
20. See, e.g., State v. Kring, 64 Mo. 591, 593 (1877); State v. Roberts, 206 A.2d 200, 203 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965).
21. Kennedy, 487 F.2d at 106. One can find some reference to concerns for the dignity of the
court in English common law as well, though such concerns do not seem pervasive. See Kraus-
kopf, supra note 15, at 356 (citing Mr. Hungerford at the trial of Christopher Layer).
22. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 641-42 nn.3-4 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (providing a list of the thirty-
five states that did not address this issue until the 1900s, as well as a list of the twenty-one states
that did not address the issue until the 1950s).
23. 71 N.E. 416, 421-22 (111. 1904).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See United States v. Theriault, 531 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1976); People v. Duran, 545 P.2d
1322 (Cal. 1976); Commonwealth v. Brown. 305 N.E.2d 830 (Mass. 1973); State v. Tolley, 226
S.E.2d 353 (N.C. 1976).
27. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337. 344 (1970).
28. Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 103 (6th Cir. 1973).
29. Id. at 111. The Sixth Circuit defined "shackling" to signify "all forms of handcuffs, leg
irons, restraining belts and the like." Id. at 103 n.1.
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the court more clearly defined standards for using in-court physical
restraints. 30
B. The Boose-Staley Doctrine
1. People v. Boose
In Boose, despite the defense attorney's objections that restraints
were unnecessary and would irrevocably prejudice the defendant, 31
the court required a fifteen-year-old murder defendant to wear
shackles and handcuffs in front of a jury throughout his competency
hearing.32 After the hearing, the defense counsel moved for a new
trial, arguing that the state abused its discretion. 33 The defense based
its motion on the defendant's previous good behavior in court, the
presence of trained, armed guards in the courtroom, and the jury
prejudice caused by the visibility of the restraints. 34 The trial court
denied the motion, and the defendant appealed. 35
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court looked to other jurisdictions,
both state and federal, 36 for guidance in deciding that physical re-
straints should only be used when there is a "showing of manifest
need."'37 Restraining the accused, the court explained, is undesirable
for three reasons: (1) it unfairly prejudices the jury; (2) it inhibits the
accused's ability to participate in his own defense; and (3) it "offends
the dignity of the judicial process. '38 The court, therefore, declared
that the trial court should use its discretion to determine the necessity
of restraints and should consider fourteen factors regarding the defen-
dant, the courtroom, and the case at bar.39 Further, the court held
that the trial court should state its reasons for restraining the defen-
30. See In re Staley, 364 N.E.2d 72 (II. 1977); People v. Boose, 362 N.E.2d 303 (I1. 1977).
31. 362 N.E.2d at 304.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 305.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 304-05.
36. Id. at 305-06; Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); United States v. Theriault, 531 F.2d
281 (5th Cir. 1976); Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1973); People v. Duran, 545 P.2d
1322 (Cal. 1976); Commonwealth v. Brown, 305 N.E.2d 830 (Mass. 1973); State v. Tolley, 226
S.E.2d 353 (N.C. 1976); AM. BAR ASS'N PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 4.1(c) (approved draft 1968).
37. Boose, 362 N.E.2d at 305.
38. Id.
39. The factors are as follows: (1) the gravity of the accusations against the defendant; (2) the
defendant's character; (3) the defendant's physical qualities, including age; (4) the defendant's
prior record; (5) the defendant's previous escape attempts; (6) evidence of the defendant's plans
to escape; (7) the defendant's threats to cause a disturbance; (8) the defendant's threats to harm
others; (9) the defendant's threats to harm himself; (10) the risk of retaliation by mobs or other
persons; (11) the possibility that other offenders may attempt to free the defendant; (12) the
2007]
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dant on record, defense counsel should have the opportunity to rebut
the need for restraints, and the jury should not be present during this
hearing.40 Because the trial court neither considered the fourteen fac-
tors, nor held a hearing regarding physical restraint, the court found
that the trial court had abused its discretion and that the defendant's
guilty plea should be reversed. 41
2. In re Staley
Two months after Boose, the Illinois Supreme Court revisited the
issue in In re Staley.42 In Staley, the trial court ordered that a fifteen-
year-old boy wear handcuffs in court. The boy had been accused of
delinquency for actively inhibiting a counselor and superintendent
from aiding a teacher who was being attacked. 43 The trial court re-
jected the defense's objection to the handcuffs, citing lax courtroom
security. 44 The defendant appealed. 45
Staley differed from Boose primarily because the defendant in Sta-
ley stood before a judge, not a jury, and because the defendant in
Staley was only required to wear handcuffs, not full shackles. 46 The
Illinois Supreme Court, citing the same sources as Boose, found that
Boose's underpinnings-presumption of innocence, ability to partici-
pate in one's own defense, and the dignity of the court system-also
apply to bench trials and when the defendant is merely placed in
handcuffs. 47 The court recognized that, in Staley, there was no fear of
prejudicing a jury, because the hearing took place before a judge. De-
spite this, the court relied on the two remaining principles to extend
the Boose requirements to bench proceedings.48 As a result, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court reversed, finding that the trial court had erred.49
In recent years, much confusion has surrounded the scope of the
Boose-Staley doctrine, particularly regarding how an appellate court
should treat a defendant who was denied a proper Boose hearing but
character of the audience; (13) the characteristics of the courtroom; and (14) the availability of
satisfactory, alternate remedies. Id. at 305-06.
40. Id. at 305.
41. Id. at 306-07.
42. 364 N.E.2d 72 (Ill. 1977).
43. Id. at 72.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 74 (Underwood, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 73 (majority opinion) ("It jeopardizes the presumption[ ] [of innocence's] value and
protection and demeans our justice for an accused without clear cause to be required to stand in
a courtroom in manacles or other restraints while he is being judged.").
48. Staley, 364 N.E.2d at 73-74.
49. Id.
[Vol. 57:193
PEOPLE V. ALLEN
did not properly preserve the issue for review.50 In 2004, the Illinois
Supreme Court reiterated that a trial court's failure to conduct a
Boose hearing violates a defendant's constitutional due process
rights.5 1 It remained unclear, however, how such a determination ap-
plied when the issue was not properly preserved. As a result, a split
developed among Illinois appellate districts. One appellate district
claimed that restraining a defendant without first conducting a Boose
hearing amounted to reversible plain error per se.52 Other courts as-
serted that the defendant must show something more than mere
restraint. 53
C. The Illinois Plain Error Doctrine
The Illinois plain error doctrine, codified in Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 615(a), allows appellate courts to examine forfeited claims "af-
fect[ing] substantial rights. '54 A claim is considered forfeited when
the defendant fails to preserve an issue for appellate review.55 The
rule signifies that "[t]he judicial system itself retains its own right to be
free of certain particularly egregious errors" despite procedural de-
fault 56 and solidifies the court's position as the ultimate "guardian[ ] of
constitutional rights and the integrity of the criminal justice system. '57
Since its enactment in 1967, Rule 615(a) has not been amended, 58 and
few scholars have attempted to analyze it,59 even though the propriety
of its application has been frequently debated in Illinois reviewing
courts60 because of its seemingly omnipresent, yet enigmatic, use in
Illinois criminal appeals. 61
50. Staley and Boose both objected to the use of restraints during their proceedings. Id. at 72;
People v. Boose, 362 N.E.2d 303, 304 (Ill. 1977).
51. See People v. Martinez, 808 N.E.2d 1089, 1090 (Il1. App. Ct. 2004).
52. People v. Brown, 828 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Il1. App. Ct. 2005).
53. See, e.g., People v. Crutchfield, 820 N.E.2d 507 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (requiring the defen-
dant to show that the error actually prejudiced him in some way); see also People v. Strickland,
843 N.E.2d 897 (Il1. App. Ct. 2006).
54. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 615(a).
55. Becker, supra note 14, at 458.
56. Paul T. Wangerin, "Plain Error" and "Fundamental Unfairness": Toward a Definition of
Exceptions to the Rules of Procedural Default, 29 DEPAUL L. REV. 753, 778 (1980).
57. Becker, supra note 14, at 455 (citing People v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d 920, 941 (I11. 2000)).
58. Id. at 460.
59. There have been only two scholars who have attempted to provide a framework for the
Illinois plain error doctrine. See id.; see also Wangerin, supra note 56.
60. See, e.g., People v. Nitz, 848 N.E.2d 982, 988-93 (I11. 2006), reh'g denied, 2006 Ill. LEXIS
638 (I11. May 22, 2006); People v. Harvey, 813 N.E.2d 181, 192-94 (I11. 2004); People v. Boyd, 845
N.E.2d 921, 932-34 (I11. App. Ct. 2006).
61. Becker, supra note 14, at 456.
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1. The Two-Pronged Approach
In Illinois, an appellant who has forfeited a claim may invoke the
plain error doctrine if the facts surrounding his proceedings fall under
one of two prongs. The first, known as the closely balanced evidence
prong, requires that the evidence was "so closely balanced that the
jury's guilty verdict may have resulted from the error and not the evi-
dence."' 62 The second, known as the fair trial prong, allows a defen-
dant to appeal a forfeited claim that "so seriously undermine[d] the
integrity of judicial proceedings as to warrant reversal. '" 63
In 2005, the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v. Herron, which
confirmed that, unlike the federal plain error doctrine, the Illinois
plain error doctrine does not require a harmless error analysis under
either prong.64 Under the first prong, defendants need only show that
error occurred and the evidence was closely balanced.65 Under the
second prong, defendants need only show "that there was 'plain error'
and that such error 'challenged the integrity of the judicial process.'- 66
Despite that attempt to clarify the doctrine, however, the waters
surrounding its application remain murky and difficult to maneuver.
More specifically, under the second prong, what makes an error
"plain," and how is plain error distinguishable from regular error?
Further, how can a defendant satisfy the test for finding plain error if
he must somehow show plain error? This circular pattern has kept
courts and practitioners guessing.
III. SUBJECT OPINION: PEOPLE V. ALLEN
Defendant Per Allen was tried for burglary in Will County, Illi-
nois. 67 Before the State rested, there was a brief exchange between
the defense counsel and the trial judge in which the defense counsel
noted that the defendant was wearing something unusual under his
clothes that formed a noticeable bump on his back.68 The judge then
62. People v. Allen, 856 N.E.2d 349, 355 (I11. 2006) (quoting People v. Herron, 830 N.E.2d 467,
475 (Ill. 2005)).
63. Becker, supra note 14, at 462.
64. Id. at 459. Harmless error analysis applies when a defendant properly preserves an objec-
tion for appeal. The term "harmless error" refers to errors at trial that were not prejudicial to
the defendant. Under harmless error analysis, the State bears the burden of persuading the
court that the errors were de minimus and did not, in fact, cause prejudice to the defendant. Id.
"In other words, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would
have been the same absent the error." People v. Thurow, 786 N.E.2d 1019, 1025 (Ill. 2003).
65. Becker, supra note 14, at 485-86.
66. 1d. at 486 (quoting Herron, 830 N.E.2d at 479-80).
67. Allen. 856 N.E.2d at 350-51.
68. Id. at 351.
[Vol. 57:193200
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asked if defense counsel would prefer that the defendant be seated in
the witness stand prior to the jury's entrance so that the jury would
not see the bump, to which the defense responded "I would prefer
unless [the stun belt] can be removed somehow." 69
The trial judge explained that, "for security purposes," the defen-
dant was wearing a "security device" controlled by the deputy and
that the defendant was not shackled, handcuffed, or "restrained in
[any] other manner. '70 This exchange took place before the jury en-
tered the courtroom.7' The jury convicted the defendant of burglary
and sentenced him to four years in prison.72
On appeal, the defense raised the issue of unnecessary restraints for
the first time, claiming that the trial court's failure to conduct a Boose
hearing constituted reversible plain error.73 The appellate court
agreed and held that it could be inferred from the judge's words that
the security belt was an electronic stun belt, that such belts have been
construed as restraints under Boose, and that requiring a defendant to
wear restraints without first conducting a Boose hearing is an abuse of
court discretion that constitutes reversible error.74 The appellate
court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. 75
A. Majority Opinion
The four-justice majority began its opinion by agreeing with the ap-
pellate court that the security device in question was an electronic
stun belt and that such devices are physical restraints.76 Although the
Allen jury never saw the stun belt, the Supreme Court reiterated Sta-
ley's concerns that the use of unnecessary restraints "hinders the de-
fendant's ability to assist his counsel, runs afoul of the presumption of
innocence, and demeans both the defendant and the proceedings. '77
Therefore, courts must conduct proper Boose hearings to support the
"manifest need" for restraints before stun belts may be used.78 Be-
69. Id. (emphasis in original).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. People v. Allen, 821 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
74. Id. at 337-39.
75. Id. at 339.
76. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 351-52.
77. Id. at 353 (citing In re Staley, 364 N.E.2d 72, 73 (Ill. 1977)). The court also recognized that
the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed these same concerns. Id. at 352 (citing Deck v. Missouri, 544
U.S. 622 (2005)). Though the court distinguished Allen's case from Deck-Deck addressed visi-
ble restraints, while Allen's restraints were hidden under his clothes-the court asserted that the
underlying concerns were the same. Id.
78. Id. at 353.
2007]
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cause Allen never received a proper Boose hearing, the court found
that the trial court's actions violated the defendant's due process
rights. 79
Yet Allen failed to object to the stun belt during trial8 o and, there-
fore, could only avail himself of the plain error doctrine to argue the
issue on appeal.81 Because there was no suggestion that the evidence
was closely balanced, Allen based his appeal on the second prong of
the plain error doctrine: the fair trial prong. 2 In its plain error analy-
sis, the majority noted a split among appellate districts regarding
whether errors resulting in due process violations-at least with re-
gard to unnecessary restraints-that went uncontested at trial are nec-
essarily plain errors.8 3
The court sided with the Fifth District and found that, to prove
plain error under the second prong, defendants have the burden of
proving that "the presumption of innocence, ability to assist his coun-
sel, or the dignity of the proceedings was compromised. '8 4 Thus, the
court reaffirmed its previous assertion that "even constitutional errors
can be forfeited" if the defendant cannot prove that the errors de-
prived him of a fair trial.85 According to the majority, the transcript
did not indicate that Allen was in pain, experienced anxiety resulting
from the stun belt, or was in any way impeded from assisting coun-
sel.86 The court was also unwilling to consider the propriety of stun
belts altogether, citing a lack of information in the record to make
such a determination and asserting that it would reserve judgment on
79. Id. at 354 (citing People v. Martinez, 808 N.E.2d 1089, 1092 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)).
80. There was some disagreement between the majority and the dissent as to whether the
defense's remarks should have been properly construed as a contemporaneous objection, but the
dissent dismissed this disagreement as "academic quibble" given that the defendant did not in-
clude this argument in his post-trial motion. Id. at 361 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 355 (majority opinion).
82. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 356.
83. Id. at 355-56. Compare People v. Brown, 828 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Il1. App. Ct. 2005) (holding
that due process violations resultant from being shackled without the benefit of a Boose hearing
are not waiveable), with People v. Crutchfield. 820 N.E.2d 507, 514 (111. App. Ct. 2004) (holding
that a defendant must prove actual prejudice to avail himself of plain error).
84. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 357.
85. Id. at 356 (citing People v. Thurow, 786 N.E.2d 1019, 1025 (I11. 2003)). The court contin-
ued, reaffirming its previous assertions as follows:
The plain-error doctrine is not a general saving clause preserving for review all errors
affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of
the court .... Instead, it is a narrow and limited exception to the general rule of forfei-
ture, whose purpose is to protect the rights of the defendant and the integrity and
reputation of the judicial process.
Id. (citing People v. Herron, 830 N.E.2d 467, 474 (Ill. 2005)).
86. Id. at 358-59.
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that issue for another day.8 7 The court, therefore, did not have
enough evidence to find reversible error. Finally, the majority indi-
cated in dicta that, had some objection to wearing the stun belt ap-
peared in the record, as in Martinez, Deck, Boose, and Staley, it would
have found a per se reversible error.88
B. Dissenting Opinion
The lengthy three-justice dissent began by agreeing that the re-
straints issue was not properly preserved for review and that the case
should thus be analyzed under the plain error doctrine.8 9 It also
agreed that, in the instant case, the second prong was the appropriate
vehicle, because the defendant had only asserted that "the error...
eroded the integrity of the judicial process and undermined the fair-
ness of his trial," not that the evidence was evenly balanced.90 Like-
wise, the dissent did not challenge the assertion that the defendant
bears the burden of persuasion under the second prong. 91 It dis-
agreed, however, as to what the defendant's burden entails. The dis-
sent interpreted precedent to mean that defendants do not have to
show actual prejudice; rather, under the second prong, they need only
show "that the error served to erode the integrity of the judicial pro-
cess and undermined the fairness of the trial proceedings. ' 92 Accord-
ing to the dissent, requiring proof of specific prejudice corrupts the
second prong of the doctrine. 93
Unlike the majority, the dissent believed that the trial court's error
resulted in fundamental unfairness. 94 In reaching that conclusion, the
dissent reiterated the three basic rights emphasized in Boose and Sta-
87. Id. at 358.
88. Id. at 360. In People v. Martinez, the defendant objected both before and during trial,
claiming that he would rather be tried in absentia than wear a stun belt. 808 N.E.2d 1089,
1090-91 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). In Deck v. Missouri, the defense objected three times during voir
dire and once again afterwards. 544 U.S. 622, 625 (2005). In People v. Boose, the defense ob-
jected to the restraints before the competency hearing and filed for a new trial after the hearing.
362 N.E.2d 303, 304-05 (I11. 977). In In re Staley, the defense objected once at the defendant's
initial hearing and again at the morning session of the adjudicatory hearing, but not at the after-
noon session. 364 N.E.2d 72, 72 (I11. 1977).
89. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 361-62 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 363.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 362. Prejudice to the defendant need not be proven as it "is presumed because of the
importance of the right involved . . . 'regardless of the strength of the evidence."' Id. (citing
People v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d 920, 941 (I11. 2000)) (emphasis in original).
93. Id. at 368.
94. Id. at 361.
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ley 9 5 and noted that plain error can exist without prejudice to the jury.
More specifically, the dissent found that the right to dignified trial
proceedings was central to the Staley decision.96
According to the dissent, the Staley court opted to forego a harm-
less error analysis, because it believed the error to be so offensive that
it was not necessary to prove actual prejudice in order to grant a re-
versal. 97 The Staley court reversed the defendant's conviction on its
merits without any showing of prejudice, because it found that hand-
cuffing a defendant or placing him in any other type of restraints with-
out cause affronts our notions of justice and tarnishes the public's
perception of the justice system.98 It was this "systemic effect" that
compelled Staley's remand.99 Thus, to the dissent, it seemed inconsis-
tent that, because the issue was not properly preserved in a post trial
motion, a constitutional violation not subject to harmless error analy-
sis should be converted into an error that necessitates a showing of
prejudice. 00 Finally, because the transcript provided no record of dis-
comfort or anxiety, the dissent questioned the court's reasoning that
the defendant could not prove prejudice. The dissent asserted that,
because actual prejudice would be exceedingly difficult to demon-
strate,101 the court should consider case law regarding the nature and
effect of stun belts. 10 2
IV. ANALYSIS
The Allen court weakened the Boose-Staley doctrine by straying
from the doctrine's original concerns. Although the court attempted
to reaffirm its commitment to the three concerns raised in Boose and
Staley,1 0 3 it chose to provide more protection to those who properly
preserve a claim for appeal than to those who do not.10 4 This prefer-
ence for procedural accuracy is inconsistent with the idea of funda-
95. The three rights are "the presumption of innocence, the ability to assist in the defense, and
the dignity of the judicial process." Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 365 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 365-66.
98. Id. at 367-68.
99. Id. at 368.
100. Id.
101. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 374 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
102. See, e.g., People v. Martinez, 808 N.E.2d 1089, 1093 (I11. App. Ct. 2004) (McDade, J.,
specially concurring); Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1193-94 (Ind. 2001).
103. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 352-53, 360.
104. Id. at 360.
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mental fairness that underscores both the Boose-Staley10 5 and plain
error doctrines. 0 6 This Part analyzes these claims and provides a
more detailed description of the doctrines involved. It first compares
Allen's ultimate disposition to the holdings of the jurisdictions cited
therein. 10 7 It then analyzes how the Allen court applied the policy
considerations underlying Boose and Staley.t0 8 Finally, it examines
the Allen court's application of the Illinois plain error doctrine. 0 9
A. Comparing Allen to Precedent from Other Jurisdictions that
Helped Form the Basis of the Boose-Staley Doctrine
By holding that appellate courts shall not review the issue of in-
court restraints unless the defendant objected at trial, the Illinois Su-
preme Court was, to a certain extent, faithful to the precedent cited by
the Boose and Staley courts. 110 Virtually none of the jurisdictions
cited in Boose allowed for a per se reversal on the issue of re-
straints.11 For instance, the Boose and Staley courts relied heavily
upon State v. Tolley, a North Carolina case. 112 Although Tolley as-
serted the three trial concerns emphasized by Boose and Staley and
reinforced the need for judges to conduct hearings before restraining
defendants during court proceedings, the North Carolina Supreme
Court dismissed the petitioner's restraints claim, because he did not
properly object." 13 As a result of the defendant's failure to object, the
court concluded that the defendant received a fair trial." 4 Today,
North Carolina continues to reject a defendant's improper restraints
claim if it was not properly preserved for appellate review. 115
105. "[A] fair trial ... is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such
requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law." People v. Boose, 362 N.E.
2d 303, 306-07 (Ill. 1977).
106. The plain error rule's "purpose is to ensure that a defendant 'is not denied his right to a
fair and impartial ... trial."' Becker, supra note 14, at 459 (quoting People v. Underwood, 378
N.E.2d 513, 516 (Ill. 1978)).
107. See infra notes 110-122 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 123-168 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 169-195 and accompanying text.
110. See Boose, 362 N.E.2d at 305-06 (citing Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101 (6th Cir.
1973)); People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 1322 (Cal. 1976); Commonwealth v. Brown, 305 N.E.2d 830
(Mass. 1973); State v. Tolley, 226 S.E.2d 353 (N.C. 1976).
111. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Boose, 362 N.E.2d at 305-06 (citing Tolley, 226 S.E.2d at 353).
113. Tolley, 226 S.E.2d at 370. "[T]he better-reasoned rule is that defendant, while ordinarily
constitutionally entitled to appear at his own trial free of shackles, must, when shackling is sug-
gested, object to the proposed restraint and, absent reasonable excuse therefore, failure to do so
will ordinarily preclude the shackling as an issue on appeal." Id.
114. Id. at 371.
115. See State v. Black, 594 S.E.2d 258 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
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Likewise, in Duran, the California Supreme Court reinforced the
"necessity of objecting to use of physical restraints."' 16 Although the
California court did not explain why such a requirement was neces-
sary, it recognized the importance of preserving the error. Today, the
court continues to hold the failure to object to in-court restraints in
great disdain. 117 "It is ... well settled, however, that the use of physi-
cal restraints in the trial court cannot be challenged for the first time
on appeal."' 18
Additionally, Massachusetts refuses to examine the restraints issue
if the defendant failed to object at trial. The Boose court frequently
cited Commonwealth v. Brown, a Massachusetts Supreme Court deci-
sion. n 9 Brown, like Duran and Kennedy, denounced the perils of un-
necessary physical restraints and emphasized the importance of
inquiring into the need for restraint before implementation.12 0 The
Massachusetts court, however, refused to analyze the issue of physical
restraints on its own; rather, the court weighed the restraint issue
against the prejudice present in the "trial as a whole" to evaluate the
abuse of judicial discretion.12' Massachusetts continues to uphold its
requirement that defendants receive a hearing before being restrained
in the courtroom, but refuses to treat such hearings "as a rigid legisla-
tive formulation, any deviation from which must result in reversal."1
22
B. The Allen Decision Conflicts with the Philosophical
Underpinnings of the Boose-Staley Doctrine
The aforementioned courts rejected the proposition that restraints
should be judged on their merits. Such considerations, however, are
irrelevant to the Boose-Staley doctrine, because they did not form the
116. People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 1322, 1326 (Cal. 1976) (citing People v. Chacon, 447 P.2d 106,
114-15 (Cal. 1968)). In Chacon, the California Supreme Court found restraints reasonable in
part because "[a]pparently counsel did not think [the restraints] improper, for he did not object
to them." 477 P.2d at 114-15.
117. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 22 P.3d 347, 382 (Cal. 2001) (citing People v. Cox, 809 P.2d
351 (Cal. 1991)). The prohibition of in-court physical restraints "seeks to avoid the pernicious
effect of the possible prejudice in the minds of the jurors, the affront to human dignity, the
disrespect for the entire judicial system . . . as well as the effect such restraints have upon a
defendant's decision to take the stand." Id. (quoting Cox, 809 P.2d at 367) (internal quotations
omitted).
118. People v. Ward, 114 P.3d 717, 730 (Cal. 2005) (internal quotations omitted).
119. See People v. Boose, 362 N.E.2d 303,305 (I1. 1977) (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 305
N.E.2d 830 (Mass. 1973)).
120. Brown, 305 N.E.2d at 834.
121. Id. at 835.
122. Commonwealth v. Martin, 676 N.E.2d 451, 456 (Mass. 1997).
[Vol. 57:193
2007] PEOPLE V. ALLEN
basis of the doctrine. 123 In deciding Boose and Staley, the court inter-
preted several cases from other jurisdictions whose philosophical un-
derpinnings-not ultimate dispositions-indicated that, when physical
restraints are not used only as a last resort, the defendant did not re-
ceive a fair trial. 124 As a result, Illinois developed a unique doctrine
for addressing the issue of unjust restraints. 125 The dissent was, there-
fore, correct in indicating that the Allen decision is inconsistent with
the underpinnings of the well-established Boose-Staley doctrine.
As mentioned above, the Boose court relied heavily upon the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's decision People v. Duran, a definitive case re-
garding unnecessary in-court restraints.1 26 What the Boose court
found compelling in Duran was not the contention that defendants
must object to restraints; rather, the Boose court was drawn to the
court's analysis of the detrimental effects of in-court restraints. 127 In
Duran, the court denounced the use of unnecessary physical re-
straints, proclaiming that "possible prejudice in the minds of jurors,
the affront to human dignity, the disrespect for the entire judicial sys-
tem ... is incident to unjustifiable use of physical restraints." 12 8 Ulti-
mately, the Boose court shared Duran's concern that, when
defendants are placed in restraints without the benefit of a hearing,
123. Likewise, "a growing trend indicates that a trial judge must consider less drastic alterna-
tives before employing shackles," and several cases have been remanded on that basis. Randall
E. Tuskowski, Spain v. Rushen: Shackles or Showtime? A Defendant's Right to See and Be Seen,
20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 175, 185-86 (1990).
124. In Staley, the court ignored both the ultimate dispositions of the cases it cited and the
specific tests for prejudice that those courts developed. The two-justice dissent in Staley dis-
agreed with the majority partly because of this issue. 364 N.E.2d 72, 74-75 (I11. 977) (Under-
wood, J., dissenting). Justice Underwood stated that "in each of the cases, other than Boose and
Duran, cited by the majority, the convictions were upheld, and in Duran multiple errors in addi-
tion to the shackling, contributed to the reversal." Id. at 74. It can be inferred, then, that the
majority was not concerned with these differences; rather, it was concerned with the broader,
underlying policy reasons for the rules set forth in those cases.
125. The Boose-Staley doctrine differs from the doctrines of other jurisdictions in several
ways. It considers unjust restraints prejudicial regardless of the weight of the evidence against a
defendant. See State v. Finch, 975 P.2d 967. 1006-07 (Wash. 1999) (noting that Illinois jurispru-
dence stemming from Boose marks an exception to the more common rule that unjust restraints
are harmless if the evidence against a defendant is great). It also applies its restraints jurispru-
dence to situations that do not involve the prejudicing of a jury. Compare Staley, 364 N.E.2d at
73 (asserting that prohibitions on restraints are enforceable in both jury and bench trials), with
People v. Vigliotti, 611 N.Y.S.2d 413 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding that "shackling a defendant
in the presence of a jury is inherently prejudicial and constitutes reversible error") (emphasis
added).
126. People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 1322, 1322 (Cal. 1976).
127. People v. Boose, 362 N.E.2d 303, 305 (Ill. 1977). The California Court made its assertion
in dicta, as could have the Illinois Court. Duran, 545 P.2d at 1326.
128. Duran, 545 P.2d at 1327. The court cited the Massachusetts and North Carolina decisions
for the same reason it cited Duran: to emphasize the concerns raised by unjustly restraining a
defendant. Boose, 362 N.E.2d at 305-06.
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the action "implies a general policy of shackling all inmate defend-
ants."12 9 Such a blanket policy constitutes an unacceptable abuse of
judicial discretion. 130
Likewise, in Boose and Staley, the Illinois Supreme Court cited sev-
eral Sixth Circuit cases with approval. 131 In part, the court drew its
conclusions from language in Woodards v. Cardwell that addressed the
effect of restraint on courtroom prejudice. 132 In Woodards, the Sixth
Circuit asserted that prejudice occurs when a defendant is shackled in
the courtroom and that the rule against such fettering constitutes "an
important component" of the right to a fair and impartial trial. 133 The
Woodards court held that, because the trial court did not make a find-
ing of necessity regarding the defendant's restraints, the court had
abused its discretion and denied the defendant his right to a fair
trial. 134
Finally, the Boose and Staley courts borrowed their three basic con-
cerns1 35 regarding restraints from another Sixth Circuit decision, Ken-
nedy v. Cardwell, decided three years after Woodards.136 Kennedy
expressed a "general rule that a fair trial demands that a defendant be
tried free of bonds except in extraordinary circumstances.' ' 137 That is,
unless extraordinary circumstances warranted the use of restraints, a
defendant who was tried while physically restrained did not receive a
fair trial. "The test on appeal is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering [the defendant] shackled." 138 The Kennedy
court defined "abuse of discretion" as a "firm conviction that the
court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it
reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors."'1 39
The Boose court followed Kennedy's guidelines to arrive at its con-
clusion. The court examined the record to determine whether the trial
court abused its discretion and found that the factors relevant to in-
court restraints had not been weighed. 40 The sparse record revealed
129. Boose, 362 N.E.2d at 306 (quoting Duran, 545 P.2d at 1329).
130. Duran, 545 P.2d at 1329.
131. Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 107 (6th Cir. 1973); Woodards v. Cardwell, 430 F.2d
978, 982 (6th Cir. 1970).
132. Woodards, 430 F.2d at 982.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 980-82.
135. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
136. See People v. Boose, 362 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. 1977).
137. Kennedy, 487 F.2d at 110.
138. Id.
139. Id. at n.19.
140. Boose, 362 N.E.2d at 306; see also supra note 39.
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little justification for Boose's shackling. 41 As a result, the Illinois Su-
preme Court found that the trial court had imposed a blanket restraint
policy like the one found unacceptable in Duran. 42 Thus, the court
held that the trial court had abused its discretion and Boose's right to
a fair trial had been violated. 43 The court decided Staley using similar
logic. 144 Neither the Boose nor the Staley decision addressed actual
prejudice to the defendant. 45 The Boose court noted the defense
counsel's argument that the jury would be "irrevocably prejudiced" if
it saw Boose in restraints.146 The court, however, never considered
the defense's objection in its analysis, nor did it consider whether any
of its three concerns were actually offended. 147 The court was content
to find reversible error and that the defendant had not been afforded
a fair trial on the possibility that such offenses occurred.
The Allen decision signifies a deviation from Boose, Staley, and
other precedent. The Allen court purported to adhere to the Boose-
Staley doctrine. 148 Instead, it weakened the doctrine, holding that it
141. Boose, 362 N.E.2d at 306.
142. Id. (citing People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 1322, 1329 (Cal. 1976)).
143. Id.
144. In re Staley, 364 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ill. 1977). The court noted that the State's allegations of
"poor security" in the courtroom "d[id] not impress." Id. Because the court found no "excep-
tional circumstances" and it was clear that a jury could not have been influenced-there was no
jury-the court concluded that Staley's "appearance, dignity, and self-respect" had been harmed
and his right to a fair trial affronted. Id. at 73-74 (citing Eaddy v. People, 174 P.2d 717, 719
(Colo. 1946)).
145. The court correctly did not apply Hauser, the first Illinois case to tackle the issue of in-
court shackling. Hauser v. People, 71 N.E. 416, 421 (Il. 1904). In Hauser, the court asserted that
jurors understood that prisoners, regardless of their guilt or innocence, would be taken to-and
from the courtroom in fetters. Therefore, the jury would not be materially prejudiced against
defendants and their claims for relief were without merit. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that
the prohibition on in-court restraints applied only during the trial proceedings. In reaching its
conclusion, however, the Hauser court only considered one of the three concerns set forth by
Boose and Staley: unfair jury prejudice. In the Hauser court's view, prejudice to the defendant
was "[t]he only possible ground of complaint." Id. (emphasis added). The court at that time did
not recognize the remaining two reasons that in-court fettering is disfavored, reasons that were
later recognized in various courts around the country. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d
101, 110 (6th Cir. 1973); Duran, 545 P.2d at 1327. Because the Hauser court did not address the
other two concerns-a defendant's ability to assist his counsel and courtroom dignity-the
Boose and Staley courts appropriately disregarded the decision.
146. Boose, 362 N.E.2d at 304.
147. Id. at 304-05.
148. People v. Allen, 856 N.E.2d 349, 352-53 (11. 2006).
[A] Boose hearing is required in stun belt cases, as in shackle or handcuff cases, be-
cause regardless of the differences between the types of restraints, they each implicate
due process concerns and thus require strict limits be placed on their use.
Additionally, this opinion takes judicial notice of the routine use of stun belts on
felons in other Will County cases in order to establish the fact of their use here, and
cites cases both in and outside our jurisdiction in support of our holding that stun belts
should be subject to a Boose hearing.
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will not provide per se protection to those who do not object to re-
straints, 149 while suggesting that it will provide per se protection to
those who do.150 Although the majority recited the incantation that
"a fair trial is different from a perfect trial," 151 in order to reject Al-
len's claim of reversible error, Boose and Staley insist that an improp-
erly restrained defendant did not receive a fair trial.' 52 A statement to
the contrary implicates a weakening of the doctrine and a "willingness
to put form over substance.' '1 53
The Allen court recognized that the Boose court frowned upon
blanket policies of restraining all defendants in lieu of individual hear-
ings.154 Further, the Allen court, quoting the passage Boose adopted
from Duran, determined that such a policy existed in Will County.
55
Therefore, Allen's due process rights were violated.156 Despite recog-
nizing such a policy, which was enough for the Boose and Staley courts
to remand, the Allen court concluded that such a showing was insuffi-
cient to merit a reversal: an objection is necessary. 57
The Allen court believed that, by objecting, a defendant shows ac-
tual harm caused by restraints, therefore, proving that he did not re-
ceive a fair trial. 158 The Boose and Staley courts, however, were not
concerned with actual harm; rather, they were frightened by the po-
tential harm to both the defendant and the judicial process caused by
unjustified in-court restraints. 159 The Boose court could have empha-
sized the importance of objection-as the Duran court hadt 6°-but
Id. at 358.
149. Id. at 360.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 356 (citing People v. Herron, 830 N.E.2d 467, 480 (I11. 2005)).
152. See People v. Boose, 362 N.E.2d 303, 306-07 (I11. 1977).
153. Petition for Rehearing for Defendant-Appellee, at 10, People v. Allen. 856 N.E.2d 349
(Ill. 2006).
154. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 354. In fact, the unacceptability of such blanket policies allowed the
conclusion that Boose's fair trial rights had been breached, thus necessitating a reversal. Boose,
362 N.E.2d at 305.
155. Allen. 856 N.E.2d at 354.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 356.
158. Id. The majority distinguishes Allen from a case in which the court reviewed restraints
on their merits because, in that case, the defendant entered a pretrial motion to remove the
restraints and included the issue in his post-trial motion. The court reviewed the restraints issue
on its merits only in the alternative. Id. at 357 (citing People v. Buss, 718 N.E.2d 1, 40 (I11.
1999)).
159. Boose, 362 N.E.2d at 305. "However strong the evidence against an accused may be ... a
fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution." Id. at 306
(quoting People v. Finn, 162 N.E.2d 354, 356 (Ill. 1959)).
160. People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 1322. 1327 (Cal. 1976).
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chose not to.161 As the dissent stated, the Staley decision illustrates
that unjust restraints affront our notions of justice and tarnish the ju-
dicial system. 162 It is difficult to understand how failing to insert the
word "objection" into the record can convert a per se reversible error
into something less that requires a defendant to prove actual
prejudice. 63
Finally, as the dissent properly indicated, it is unclear how a defen-
dant may prove actual prejudice on appeal. 164 Appellate courts are
limited to information in the record.165 If a defendant fails to object,
it is exceedingly difficult to prove from a transcript that the restraints
influenced a jury, interfered with the assistance of counsel, or compro-
mised the dignity of the judicial proceeding. 166 This was one of Ken-
nedy's criticisms of jurisdictions that required that defendants show
something more than mere restraint for reversal.167 The Allen major-
ity, however, does not offer a solution. If the majority's intention
was-as it appears to have been-to remain faithful to Boose and Sta-
ley,16s it failed. Instead, it weakened the protections of a powerful
doctrine and lost sight of Boose and Staley's underpinnings.
C. The Allen Decision and the Illinois Plain Error Doctrine's
Second Prong
The Allen decision contorted the second prong of the Illinois plain
error doctrine, while providing little guidance for its application to
Boose issues. In 2005, Herron attempted to clarify the second prong
of the plain error doctrine by articulating that "the defendant must
prove there was plain error and that the error was so serious that it
affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integ-
rity of the judicial process. ' 169
Examined through the lens of the Illinois plain error doctrine and
Herron's test, a defendant's unjustified restraint would constitute
plain error per se. First, Herron asserted that the error must be
161. Boose, 362 N.E.2d at 303-05.
162. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 368 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
163. Id. The inverse is equally incomprehensible: inserting the word "objection" into the
record would raise a proof-contingent error to the level of a per se reversible error.
164. Id. at 373.
165. Id. at 358 (majority opinion).
166. Id. at 373 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
167. Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 107 n.12 (6th Cir. 1973) ("These decisions do not
state how the defendant is to show prejudice and the rule that a jury cannot impeach its own
verdict would appear to operate here to foreclose any attempt by the defendant to show he was
in fact prejudiced.").
168. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 358.
169. Id. at 356 (citing Herron, 830 N.E.2d at 479) (emphasis in original).
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"plain." The semantic confusion caused by the requirement that one
must prove that there was plain error in order to show reversible plain
error can be overcome by an examination of case law. In Illinois,
"plain" error refers to errors concerning "substantial rights.' u70 Plain
errors "reveal breakdowns in the adversary system, as distinguished
from typical trial mistakes;"1 71 that is, "the asserted error must be
something 'fundamental to the integrity of the judicial process."" 72
In its application to the Allen case, the dissent correctly noted that
Boose deemed errors affecting a defendant's right to a fair trial funda-
mental. 173 More narrowly, the Staley court found that rights affecting
the presumption of innocence are "central to our administration of
justice. '174 The majority likewise conceded that errors affecting a de-
fendant's right to a fair trial, including the improper implementation
of in-court restraints, constitute due process violations.175
The defendant must then address the "affected the fairness of the
defendant's trial" component and the "challenged the integrity of the
judicial process component."'1 76 These factors should be satisfied by
the mere use of restraints. The Boose and Staley decisions imply that,
when a defendant is improperly placed in physical restraints, the de-
fendant's trial was inherently unfair, in part, because the judicial pro-
170. People v. Keene, 660 N.E.2d 901, 909 (111. 1995).
171. Id. at 910 (citing Wangerin, supra note 56, at 778) (internal quotations omitted).
172. Id. (citing People v. Green, 386 N.E.2d 272, 277 (Ill. 1979) (Ryan, J., specially
concurring)).
173. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 365 (Freeman, J., dissenting). See also People v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d
920, 940 (Ill. 2000) ("[Wlhen a defendant's right to a fair trial has been denied, this court must
take corrective action so that we may preserve the integrity of the judicial process.").
174. In re Staley, 364 N.E.2d 72. 73 (Il1. 1977).
175. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 354. The majority, however, curiously relies on the court's interpre-
tation of the prison garb scenario in Estelle v. Williams, 435 U.S. 501 (1976), to support its con-
clusion that the failure to object to a Boose violation waives all right to appeal the issue: "[tihe
failure to make an objection to the court to being tried in such clothes ... is sufficient to negate
the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation." Allen, 856 N.E.2d
at 354 (citing Estelle, 435 U.S. at 512-13) see People v. Hyche, 396 N.E.2d 6, 12 (Ill. 1979) (citing
the same passage from Estelle to dismiss an appellant's restraints claim). Such an application
seems inappropriate in Allen's situation considering that the court found that the judge's abuse
of discretion did, in fact, establish a constitutional violation. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 354. Both
defense counsel and Justice Freeman's dissent argued that Hyche's relevant conclusions were
overruled in 1999 by People v. Buss when the court chose to review physical restraints on their
merits. See Petition for Rehearing for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 153, at 8; Allen, 856
N.E.2d at 366 (Freeman, J., dissenting) (both citing People v. Buss, 718 N.E.2d 1, 40 (Ill. 1999)).
It would have seemed more appropriate, however, for the dissent to argue that, because the
court concluded that Allen's restraints constituted a due process violation, Hyche was irrelevant,
regardless of whether Buss' analysis trumped Hyche.
176. Though these components appear to overlap with the court's definitions of plain error,
perhaps folding themselves in under the concept, one might conceive of a situation in which, for
instance, an error affected something fundamental to the judicial process without challenging the
process's integrity.
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cess was jeopardized.1 77 The majority quoted Staley's assertion that
restraining a defendant without cause "jeopardizes the presumption"
of innocence's "value and protection and demeans our justice.''1 78
"[A]ny unnecessary restraint is impermissible because it hinders the
defendant's ability to assist his counsel, runs afoul of the presumption
of innocence, and demeans both the defendant and the proceedings."'179
These citations support the proposition that both the fairness of the
defendant's trial was affected and the integrity of the judicial process
was challenged per se.
Having proven that the judge's plain error affected the fairness of
Allen's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, the
Herron plain error analysis should have ended. 180 In its desire to keep
the plain error doctrine narrow, 181 however, the majority embedded a
new step into Illinois plain error analysis: a showing of actual
prejudice. It found justification for such a requirement in Herron's
confusing language. 182 In Herron, the court stated that, under the sec-
ond prong, "[p]rejudice to the defendant is presumed because of the
importance of the right involved, 'regardless of the strength of the evi-
dence.' [Under both prongs], the burden of persuasion remains with
the defendant."' 8 3 While the dissent interpreted this passage to indi-
cate that, under the second prong, prejudice need not be shown, 184 the
majority concluded the opposite.185 To reach this conclusion, the ma-
jority focused on the second sentence, interpreting it to place a burden
on the defendant to prove actual prejudice at trial.' 86 This construc-
tion is troubling, because it renders the first sentence meaningless. If
a defendant must point to something in the record that indicates that
he was in some way prejudiced, then prejudice is not assumed.
177. See supra notes 30-52 and accompanying text.
178. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 352 (quoting Staley, 362 N.E.2d at 73) (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 353 (citing Staley, 362 N.E.2d at 73) (emphasis added).
180. The majority, however, misapplied the above citations from Staley to conclude only that
stun belts should be treated as any other form of physical restraint. Id. That is, "electronic stun
belts are restraining devices the use of which is subject to the same restrictions as shackles." Id.
181. Id. at 356.
The plain error doctrine is not 'a general saving clause preserving for review all errors
affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of
the trial court.' Instead, it is a narrow and limited exception to the general rule of
forfeiture, whose purpose is to protect the rights of the defendant and the integrity and
reputation of the judicial process.
Id. (citations omitted).
182. Id.
183. People v. Herron, 830 N.E.2d at 480 (citation omitted).
184. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 362 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 357 (majority opinion).
186. Id. at 356.
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A closer reading of the paragraph surrounding the quotation sheds
light on the interaction between the two sentences:
We reiterate: the plain-error doctrine bypasses normal forfeiture
principles and allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved er-
ror when either (1) the evidence is close, regardless of the serious-
ness of the error, or (2) the error is serious, regardless of the
closeness of the evidence. In the first instance, the defendant must
prove "prejudicial error." That is, the defendant must show both
that there was plain error and that the evidence was so closely bal-
anced that the error alone severely threatened to tip the scales of
justice against him. The State, of course, can respond by arguing
that the evidence was not closely balanced, but rather strongly
weighted against the defendant. In the second instance, the defen-
dant must prove there was plain error and that the error was so seri-
ous that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged
the integrity of the judicial process. Prejudice to the defendant is pre-
sumed because of the importance of the right involved, "regardless
of the strength of the evidence." In both instances, the burden of
persuasion remains with the defendant.' 8 7
Read in a broader context, the sentence asserting that the court will
presume prejudicial error is used to contrast the first prong of the
plain error doctrine with the second. That is, a defendant must prove
prejudicial error under the first prong, but not under the second.
Thus, the defendant's burden of persuasion, as indicated in the last
sentence, refers to a showing that (1) a plain error (2) was serious
enough to have an effect on the fairness of his trial and (3) cause harm
to the judicial system's integrity. As discussed above, a showing that
the defendant was unjustly restrained fulfills the requirements of this
test. 188
The court offers little guidance to practitioners for determining
what constitutes a showing of prejudice sufficient to carry the defen-
dant's burden. The court asserted that the defendant must, at a mini-
mum, point to something in the record that is indicative of prejudice
to the defendant. 1 9 What evidence the court would accept, however,
is unclear. Practitioners may glean from Allen's use of Martinez that,
when a defendant "object[s] vigorously" to the use of restraints, but
fails to properly preserve the issue in his post-trial motion, he has
shown prejudice. 190 Likewise, the court hints that, if some indication
187. Herron, 830 N.E.2d at 479-80 (citations omitted) (first two emphases added).
188. See supra notes 149-80 and accompanying text.
189. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 359.
190. Id. at 354.
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of nervousness or anxiety can be shown, the defendant might also be
able to carry his burden. 191
The requirement that a defendant show specific instances of
prejudice in the record is disturbing, particularly in Boose cases. Both
Allen's defense counsel and Justice Freeman's dissent offer another
valid concern regarding record proof of prejudice in Boose cases: un-
less the defendant makes an actual, verbal statement against the use
of restraints, the record will not show hindrance to the defendant. 192
Apart from nodding to indicate "yes" or head-shaking to indicate
"no," trial transcripts do not note non-verbal gesticulations, incidents,
or demeanors. 193 It would be difficult for a defendant to show, for
instance, that he hesitated to approach his counsel for fear that the
stun belt would be activated, thus proving an inability to assist in his
own defense. Likewise, the record would not reflect outward indicia
of anxiety-such as shaking, stuttering, or twitching-that would
demonstrate an assault on the defendant's dignity and the dignity of
the judicial proceedings. 194 Furthermore, the record would not indi-
cate whether the jury was aware of handcuffs, irons, belts, or the like,
which would be necessary to prove jury prejudice.
By requiring that defendants prove actual prejudice, the court cor-
rupted the plain error doctrine's second prong. As a result, it pun-
ishes defendants for their attorneys' procedural errors. 95 Because of
its preference for form over function, the court created more confu-
sion and ambiguity for applying the plain error doctrine to Boose
cases.
V. IMPACT
After Allen, Illinois appellate courts will not find per se reversible
plain error when a defendant is physically restrained without the ben-
efit of a Boose hearing: for reversal, the defendant must show actual
prejudice. As a result, Allen significantly affected how both trial and
appellate attorneys should approach cases in which a defendant was
physically restrained during court proceedings. This Part examines
the practical effects that the Allen decision will have on the Boose-
191. Id. at 358.
192. See id. at 374 (Freeman, J., dissenting); Petition for Rehearing for Defendant-Appellee,
supra note 153, at 5.
193. See Petition for Rehearing for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 153, at 5.
194. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 374 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
195. Petition for Rehearing for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 153. at 5.
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Staley doctrine,1 96 the Illinois plain error doctrine,' 97 and Boose cases
involving plain error.1 98
A. Allen and the Boose-Staley Doctrine
Allen's finding that unjust restraints do not constitute per se revers-
ible error marks an erosion of the Boose-Staley doctrine. Despite the
court's assertion that it has left Boose and Staley whole, 199 it removed
a key foundational component of the decisions' reasoning. As dis-
cussed above, the Staley court believed that the potential for harm
caused by unjust physical restraints was so grave that the failure to
administer a Boose hearing merited reversal of the entire proceed-
ing.200 In Allen, however, the Illinois Supreme Court truncated the
scope of its concerns. The Allen majority abandoned the court's belief
that the potential harm created by unjustly restraining a defendant
produces unfair trial conditions and, instead, argued that only actual,
proven harm may create such conditions.
Thus, the court shifted its analysis of Boose-Staley cases from a fo-
cus on the possibility of harm caused by applying in-court physical
restraints to a focus on actual harm caused by such restraints. As a
result, defendants in Boose cases must now prove that unjust re-
straints prejudiced their proceedings, rather than simply proving that
in-court restraints were unjust. The court, therefore, removed from
Boose and Staley's protection the class of defendants that can demon-
strate potential harm but cannot prove actual harm.
Although the Allen majority suggested that, in non-plain-error
cases, a trial objection may satisfy the proof of prejudice requirement
so as to invoke Boose-Staley's protections, it remains to be seen what
level and frequency of objection must be made to demonstrate
prejudice. 20' The Allen majority cited a variety of cases-Martinez,
Deck, Boose, and Staley-which illustrate varying degrees of objection
to in-court restraints that the court found persuasive. 20 2 The intensity
of objection in these cases ranged from Martinez's vigorous protest,20 3
in which the defendant repeatedly expressed his aversion to restraints,
ultimately declaring that he would prefer to be tried in absentia rather
196. See infra notes 199-207 and accompanying text.
197. See infra notes 208-214 and accompanying text.
198. See infra notes 215-224 and accompanying text.
199. See Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 360.
200. See supra notes 142-147 and accompanying text.
201. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 360.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 354.
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than remain restrained,20 4 to Staley's mild objection, in which defense
counsel objected once during the initial hearing and once again at the
adjudicatory hearing.20 5 The Allen court found that these factual situ-
ations sufficiently demonstrated prejudicial conditions. 20 6 The court
made clear, however, that a mere colloquy between the defense attor-
ney and the trial judge, such as in Allen's case, shall not constitute
sufficient evidence of prejudice.20 7 Any amount or intensity of objec-
tion that lies in the middle ground will likely be the subject of future
appeals.
B. Allen's Effect on the Illinois Plain Error Doctrine
The Allen decision will benefit practitioners to the extent that it
clarified whether a proof-of-prejudice requirement applies to the sec-
ond prong of the Illinois plain error doctrine. 208 When an appellant
wishes to appeal an issue under plain error's second prong, he must
now prove that (1) plain error (2) caused harm to the judicial system's
integrity, (3) was serious enough to have an effect on the fairness of
his trial, and (4) actually prejudiced his trial.209 To satisfy the fourth
component, the appellate court will subject the defendant to a prejudi-
cial error test, in which the defendant bears the burden of indicating
specific evidence that proves prejudice.
The prejudicial error test, however, should not be confused with the
harmless error test. Although the harmless error test was originally
part of the Illinois plain error doctrine, 210 many believed that Herron
reaffirmed the inapplicability of such a test under the fair trial
prong.211 This remains true after Allen. Allen did not reinsert a harm-
less error provision into the plain error doctrine. Although, under Al-
len, an error not proven prejudicial will be deemed inconsequential,
204. People v. Martinez, 808 N.E.2d 1089, 1090-91 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
205. In re Staley, 364 N.E.2d 72, 73 (Ill. 1977).
206. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 360.
207. Id. at 359.
208. See id. at 360.
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., People v. Kliner, 705 N.E.2d 850, 890-91 (IlI. 1998): People v. Childs. 636
N.E.2d 534, 542 (111. 1994).
211. See generally Becker, supra note 14. Errors under the second prong are "so fundamental
to the integrity of the judicial process, they must be considered by the court regardless of the
guilt of the defendant and therefore the harmless error test, even harmless error beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." Id. at 485 (citing People v. Green, 386 N.E.2d 272, 278 (Ill. 1979)). Therefore,
"[Herron's] holding leaves no doubt that harmless error is not a component in the plain error
analysis under Illinois' fair trial prong." Id. at 486.
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the harmless error test is not implicated. 212 Under the harmless error
test, the state has the burden of proof; under the new plain error test,
the defendant has the burden of proof.213 That is, Allen inserted a
requirement that is roughly the inverse of the harmless error test: in-
stead of requiring the prosecution to prove that an error was harmless,
Allen requires the defendant to show that an error was not
harmless.2 14
C. Allen's Effect on Boose Cases Considered Under the Illinois
Plain Error Doctrine
Reiterating its finding in Herron, the Allen court declared that most
errors will not be reviewed under the plain error doctrine and that the
doctrine will remain "a narrow and limited exception to the general
rule of forfeiture," reserved only for grave errors that deny a defen-
dant a fair trial. 215 Boose violations only fall under this category when
the defendant proves prejudice. The court carried this restrictive ap-
proach even further, affirming Thurow's statement that "even consti-
tutional errors can be forfeited if the error is not of such magnitude
that it deprives the defendant of a fair trial. '' 21 6 Therefore, neither
Boose's protections nor the finding of a constitutional error will neces-
sarily result in a successful appeal if the defendant did not object at
trial .217
Additionally, by requiring proof of actual prejudice, the court sub-
ordinated its concern for the integrity of the judicial process to the
other two Boose concerns: jury prejudice and the ability to assist
counsel. The Allen court cited with approval People v. Barney, an ap-
pellate decision declaring that "[t]he necessity to preserve the integ-
rity and reputation of the judicial process is a purpose of the [plain
error] doctrine, not a lone, triggering factor for its implementation. '218
Because a defendant could presumably prove plain error by showing
damage to jury perception or ability to assist counsel without demon-
strating harm to the judicial process, 219 the court minimized the im-
212. Under harmless error analysis. the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
errors committed during the proceedings were de minimus and did not prejudice the defendant.
ld: at 459.
213. See People v. Herron. 830 N.E.2d 467, 477 (111. 2005) (stating that "the two analyses differ
on which party bears the burden of proof").
214. See Allen. 856 N.E.2d at 356.
215. Id.
216. Id. (citing People v. Crutchfield, 820 N.E.2d 507, 514-515 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)) (citation
omitted).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 360 (citing People v. Barney, 844 N.E.2d 80, 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)).
219. See Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 359.
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portance of proving harm to judicial integrity. The damage alone is
not enough; coupled with one of the other Boose concerns, it becomes
unnecessary.
Finally, the court never determined what remedy would be appro-
priate for a Boose violation found under the plain error doctrine.220
Nevertheless, the court suggested that a reversal would be appropri-
ate. It took notice of the split among districts-some districts have
reversed convictions and remanded cases, while others have simply
mandated retrospective Boose hearings-but reserved the question
for a later date.221 The court suggested, however, that, if plain error
were found, it would warrant a reversal, not simply a remand for a
retrospective restraints hearing.222 In comparing Allen to Boose, Sta-
ley, Martinez, and Deck, the court indicated that the factual situations
present in the latter four "allow for a per se finding of reversible er-
ror. ' '22 3 It, therefore, seems probable that, where plain error is found
in Boose cases, the Court will find reversible error.22 4
VI. CONCLUSION
People v. Allen demonstrates the current tension between the Illi-
nois plain error and Boose-Staley doctrines over the extent of protec-
tion that Illinois courts will offer defendants. Allen now requires a
defendant who wishes to invoke the plain error doctrine's protections
to demonstrate (1) plain error that (2) caused harm to the judicial
system's integrity, (3) was serious enough to have an effect on the
fairness of his trial, and (4) actually prejudiced his trial. To satisfy the
fourth element, a defendant must provide record evidence of an ob-
jection made during proceedings, prove from the record that the re-
straints prejudiced the jury, or demonstrate that the defendant's
ability to assist counsel was inhibited. If these elements are satisfied,
the court will recognize plain error and reverse and remand the
conviction.
220. Id. at 360.
221. Id. Compare People v. Buckner, 831 N.E.2d 676, 680 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (finding plain
error in the unjust restraining of a defendant and remanding the case for a "retrospective Boose
hearing"), with People v. Brown, 828 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (finding plain error
after a trial court improperly restrained the defendant and subsequently reversing and remand-
ing the conviction).
222. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 360.
223. Id.
224. Since Allen, dissenting Justice McMorrow has retired and has been replaced by Justice
Burke. Despite the close four-to-three division of the court, Justice McMorrow's departure will
not likely affect the outcome of future, similar cases. The majority remains in tact, with Justice
Karmeier (the author of the majority opinion), Justice Fitzgerald, Justice Garman, and Chief
Justice Thomas remaining on the bench.
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Although Allen clarified the district court split regarding whether
Boose violations amount to per se reversible error-they do not-it
undermined the Boose doctrine and corrupted the Illinois plain error
doctrine. If the Illinois Supreme Court's intent was to leave Boose
and Staley intact, it failed. By purging itself of its fear of the potential
harm caused by physical restraints, contradicting Staley's underpin-
nings, the Illinois Supreme Court watered down the doctrine. Like-
wise, if the court's intent was to remain faithful to Herron, it also
failed. By misinterpreting Herron's language, it added a new compo-
nent to the doctrine's second prong: proof of prejudice. Allen weak-
ened the Boose-Staley and Illinois plain error doctrines and left
defendants with more hurdles to jump.
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